ABSTRACT Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) are the collection of patient's health data systematically in a digital format. They eliminate the complicated paper-based medical records and ensure the accuracy and legibility of health data to improve quality care. As the amount of the EMRs explosion, the traditional medical system is unable to equip with sufficient storage and computing capacities. Therefore, it is crucial to outsourcing this EMRs to the cloud server, which is a flexible and cost-effective mode in data management. However, the loss of control over the patient's EMRs makes it a severe challenge in the integrity of outsourced data. In this paper, we propose an efficient certificateless provable data possession (CL-PDP) scheme without bilinear pairing for the EMRs stored in the cloud medical server. A formal security proof on the random oracle model demonstrates the security of our proposal. In addition, our CL-PDP protocol satisfies the following properties: unconditionally anonymous, privacy preservation, public verifiability, and reliability of the trusted third party. At last, an elaborate performance evaluation with other related schemes shows that this proposal is efficient and practical.
I. INTRODUCTION
Handwritten paper-based medical records possess poorly readability, costly storage and management, which contributes to medical errors frequently. Electric Medical Records (EMRs), containing the medical and clinical data, may help with the standardization of data and facilitate the retrieved and analysis of healthcare information [1] . Additionally, healthcare data in the electrical form can be applied anonymously in quality care improvement, medical resource management and distribution and public health communicable disease surveillance. For these advantages, the Affordable
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Care Act of America had required that all US patients must be equipped with EMRs by 2014, and approximately 35 billion dollar would be spent on supporting the installation of records systems [2] , [3] .
EMRs are a data-intensive domain associated with each patient where a large number of data is created, disseminated, stored and accessed daily, including demographic information, diagnoses, laboratory test and results, prescriptions, radiological images, clinical note and more [4] . The size of each patient's EMR is growing with every treatment, which increases the overhead of storage and management seriously in the local server. In order to address this challenge, the cloud computing is a potential solution. It is obviously that this technology plays a significant role in enhancing the availability of EMRs in real-time and reducing the cost of records management [5] .
Cloud computing is a distributed computation model over a shared pool of different types of virtualized computing resources, such as computing, service and storage [6] . In the cloud paradigm, the entity purchased the cloud services is authorized to outsource his data into cloud platform without concerning the cloud infrastructure and maintenance supported by the cloud service provider (CSP). Accordingly, organizations and individuals are facilitated to employ this efficient, flexible and economical cloud service. Integrating the cloud computing with EMRs, as shown in FIGURE 1, it will take a number of advantages for the cloud client. For example, (1) cloud computing supports the real-time medical data sharing regardless of geographical locations; (2) cloud computing provides the computation resource elasticity as needed; (3) cloud computing handles big data to access valuable insights from the analysis of big healthcare data to making some accurate researches and policy decisions [7] , [8] .
Although the client enjoys the desirable features from CSP, there are some serious security concerns in data outsourcing [9] . Once EMRs are outsourced to cloud servers, the data owner loses control over his own data physically. Moreover, EMRs contains personal and sensitive information, which may be attractive to cybercriminals frequently. For instance, without authorization, a batch of EMRs are sold to the metro pharmaceutical company for seeking benefits financially. And any minor changes in EMRs would lead to false diagnosis, even threaten life in severe cases. Therefore, the privacy and integrity of EMRs must be protected not only from the external adversaries, but also the unauthorized access from inside (e.g., CSP, the trusted third party, etc).
How to preserve privacy and integrity of the remote data is an attractive research topic in the cloud computing.
Provable Data Possession (PDP) [10] , [11] at untrusted storage platform is a novel technique that a user can check the integrity without downloading all the data file from the remote servers. In a PDP scheme, a file is divided into many meta data blocks to finish the integrity checking on behalf of the whole file. Due to the necessity and practicability, remote data integrity checking based on PDP scheme has attracted extensive research interest.
A. RELATED WORKS
For checking the data stored in the remote, Blum et al. gave an issuing of auditing firstly that enables the data owner to check the integrity of remote data without the entire plain data [12] . Due to verifying all the read and write files, this memory checking scheme is much more difficult and expensive. To avoid verifying all the data on the remote server, Atentiese et al. [10] introduced a notion of PDP to checking the integrity on the untrusted cloud server. They constructed authenticators to ensure remote data integrity with a high probability based on RSA paradigm, and it achieved constant computation and communication cost on both the cloud server and user. In 2008, a model named as Proof of Retrievability (PoR) with provable security was presented by Juels and Kaliski [13] . Taking use of PoR, the data stored in the remote cloud server can be retrieved and the data integrity can be checked by the verifier. In order to preserve privacy, by using a random masking technique, Wang et al. [14] gave a remote data integrity auditing scheme to protect the data privacy from the public verifier. Yan et al. [15] took using of homomorphic hash function to construct a remote VOLUME 7, 2019 data possession checking protocol, which supported data dynamics and provided an efficient operation. Wang et al. [16] employed the ring signature scheme to designed a public auditing scheme on the shared data in cloud, which protected the identity privacy of data owner. Guan et al. [17] explored indistinguishability obfuscation for building a PoR data integrity auditing scheme. For the symmetric key primitives, this scheme offered a light-weight storage. In the public auditing scheme proposed by Yang et al. [18] , it generated authenticators to protect the identity privacy and supported the identity traceability for group members. Shen et al. [19] introduced a third party medium to check the integrity of remote data on behalf of verifiers, which greatly reduced the computation burden on the verifier side and the data privacy could be preserved. They also designed a novel authenticator named as Homomorphic Invisible Authenticator (HIA) to protect privacy of authenticator in their remote data possession checking scheme [20] . Recently, Ye et al. [21] proposed a decentralized big data auditing scheme based on the blockchain that provided an improved reliability and stability. In addition, this scheme prevented any user from deriving other privacy in the chain. However, these aforementioned protocols were constructed on the traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which suffered from the complicated certificate management problem.
To address this heavy weakness, Wang et al. [22] introduced the concept of identity-based PDP (ID-PDP) that utilized the user's name or e-mail to replace the public key. Moreover, it was extend to check the integrity of remote data in multi-cloud storage [23] . To improve the performance, Wang et al. [24] took a proxy into consideration to design a remote data integrity checking scheme, where the mission of this proxy was processing data for user. Wang et al. [25] proposed the concept of incentive and unconditionally anonymous ID-PDP firstly that was mainly applied to protect and encourage the crime-reporter. In the scheme [26] , Yu et al. constructed a concrete ID-based cloud data integrity checking protocol by using of RSA signature. This protocol supports variable-size file blocks and public auditing. To promote the security, by employing key-homomorphic cryptographic primitive, Yu et al. [27] proposed a PDP scheme with perfect data privacy preserving in ID-based cryptosystem. In the scheme [28] , the file stored in the cloud server could be shared to others and the sensitive data was still hidden privately. Meanwhile, the presented ID-based remote data integrity auditing scheme is executed efficiently. Unfortunately, it is well known that ID-based cryptosystem suffers from the key escrow problem seriously, i.e., the Private Key Generator (PKG) has ability of accessing all users' private keys.
To avoid the key escrow problem in ID-PDP, Wang et al. [29] introduced the first primitive of certificateless PDP (CL-PDP), whereas it could not resist the outside adversary to replace the public key of user. To enhance the security, He et al. [30] built a novel CL-PDP based on bilinear pairing to withstand the outside and inside adversary. However, both [29] and [30] achieved no privacy preservation without considering the trust level of authority. The CL-PDP scheme in [31] suffered a malicious cloud server from modifying or deleting the data undetected. He et al. [32] and Wu et al. [33] concentrated on the privacy of CL-PDP scheme, which defined the security models of privacypreserving CL-PDP scheme, and gave formal security proof in the random oracle model, respectively. Li et al. [34] presented a new remote data possession checking scheme with multi-manager. Also, this protocol supports efficient user revocation from the group. Nevertheless, the operation of bilinear pairing produced a tremendous computational burdens on these protocols.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose a novel CL-PDP scheme without bilinear pairing for EMRs system based on He et al.'s protocol [32] . Our major research contributions can be summarized as below:
(1) We introduce a novel model of CL-PDP scheme according to [32] , which enables to promote the trust level of the third party (i.e., the key generator center (KGC) in this scheme) to the highest Level-III, instead of Level-II in [32] .
(2) We design a concrete CL-PDP scheme without bilinear pairing in the novel model, which reduces the computation overhead sharply. Furthermore, we demonstrate the proof of security in the random oracle model formally, and conclude that this protocol is secure against the Type-I and Type-II adversaries if the DLP and CDHP assumptions hold. Additionally, it shows that this scheme satisfies the various security requirements, such as unconditionally anonymous, privacy preservation, public verifiability and reliability.
(3) In order to evaluate the designed CL-PDP scheme, we make some analysis on the performance between the proposal and other related schemes. The comparison results on communication cost, computation cost and properties show that our proposed CL-PDP scheme has advantages over others.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the system model, security model and some preliminaries of this work. Then, Section 3 provides the detailed description of CL-PDP in the EMRs system model. Section 4 constructs the concrete CL-PDP scheme to check the integrity of EMRs. In section 5, we demonstrate that this scheme is provably secure in random oracle model. Section 6 evaluates the performances between this work and others. Finally, we make the conclusion remark of this whole paper in Section 7.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide some definitions used in this paper, which includes hardness assumptions, trust level, system and security models.
A. HARDNESS ASSUMPTIONS
First of all, let G be an additive cyclic group with prime order p, and P be a generator of G. Moreover, there is a class of the probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A.
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) Assumption):
Given a tuple (P, Q = x · P) ∈ G × G, it is computationally infeasible for every A to figure out x ∈ Z * p . The advantage of A in resolving the solution of the DLP is formulated as:
p , it is computationally infeasible for every A to calculate xy · P. The advantage of A in finding CDH solution is formulated as:
B. TRUST LEVEL
The trust level [35] provides a method to evaluate the credibility of the authority (e.g., CA in PKI, PKG in identity-based and KGC in certificateless cryptosystem) in the public key cryptography, which are demonstrated as follows:
Level-I. The authority accesses the user's private key or work it out easily. Therefore, the authority has ability of impersonating any user at any time without being detected.
Level-II. The authority cannot obtain the user's private key (or work it out unsuccessfully). Nevertheless, this authority enables to impersonate the legal user as usual by generating the false guarantees (such as false public key in the certificateless cryptosystem).
Level-III. The authority cannot reach the user's private key. Moreover, it can be proven that the authority generates the false guarantees for the authenticated user if it has done.
According to these descriptions, it can be easily concluded that the general PKI, identity-based and certificateless system fall into Level-III, Level-I and Level-II respectively.
C. SYSTEM MODEL OF CL-PDP
In this subsection, we revise the original model of CL-PDP to be an advanced one that the credibility of authority reaches Level-III.
A CL-PDP scheme in this paper consists of eight algorithms: Setup, User-Registration, Extract-PartialKey, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, Tag-Generation, Generate-Proof and Verify-Proof. These algorithms are described detailedly as follows:
Setup: On input a security parameter 1 σ , KGC returns the system parameters params, the master private key mpk, and keeps mpk secretly.
User-Registration: On input the system parameters params, the user registers in this system and returns a public key pk and a secret key sk.
Extract-Partial-Key: On input params, mpk, the user's identity ID, and his/her public key pk, KGC executes this algorithm and returns a partial private key D ID to the user via a confidential and authentic channel, and a partial public key P ID .
Set-Private-Key: On input params, the user's partial private key D ID , and the secret key sk, the user runs this algorithm and returns his private key SK ID .
Set-Public-Key: On input params, the user's partial public key P ID , and the public key pk, the user runs this algorithm and returns his public key PK ID .
Tag-Generation: For the file F = {m i } n i=1 , the user generates a pair of one-time-use signing key sk F and verification key vk F , and then returns a cluster of tag {T i } n i=1 for each block of F.
Generate-Proof: Cloud server stores n block-tag pairs
, upon receiving the challenge, it calculates and generates the proof .
Verify-Proof: This algorithm is executed by a verifier to check the integrity of remote data. After verification, it will output ''Accept'' or ''Reject'', which denotes that is a valid proof or not.
D. SECURITY MODEL OF CL-PDP
In a CL-PDP scheme, it usually encounters two types of adversaries A I and A II . A I acts as a dishonest user whose ability is replacing the public key of any entity with a value selected by itself. However, A I cannot access the master private key generated by KGC. On the contrary, A II acts as an honest-but-curious KGC who has ability to achieve the master private key ( thus, it figures out the user's partial private key easily). In addition, A II is allowed to access the private key of user instead of replacing his public key.
Definition 3: A CL-PDP scheme is secure if no polynomial bounded adversary A ∈ {A I , A II } has a non-negligible advantage to win the following interactive game with challenger C.
Setup: The challenger C takes a security parameter 1 σ as input, and runs the Setup algorithm in the system model. Then, it returns the system parameters params to A. If A is Type-I adversary, it keeps the master private key mpk to itself secretly. Otherwise (i.e., if A is Type-II adversary), it sends mpk to A.
Query: A makes some queries on the following five oracles and C answers back.
(1) Create-DataOwner: Upon receiving this query, C produces the private key, partial private key and secret value of the data owner, returns the public key of data owner to A as an answer.
(2) Partial-Key-Extraction: For Type-I adversary only, upon receiving a partial key query for identity ID, C computes (P ID , D ID ) according to the algorithm Extract-Partial-Key and sends to A as an answer.
(3) Public-Key-Replacement: For identity ID and its valid public key, A replaces his public key with a new value of its choice. This new public key will be recorded and used by C in the future computations and responses to the query executed by the adversary A. (4) Secret-Value-Extraction: Upon receiving a secret value query on identity ID, C returns a secret value of ID to the adversary A as an answer.
(5) Generate-Tag: For a file F, it is divided into n blocks. C produces a tag for every block and sends these tags to the adversary A.
Forge: In this phase, A outputs an one-time-use verification key A * F and a tag T * corresponding the challenging identity ID * . A ∈ {A I , A II } wins this game if the following conditions hold.
(1) T * is a valid tag corresponding the challenging identity ID * . (2) T * is not generated by making a query on GenerateTag.
(3) ID * is not involved in the algorithms of PartialKey-Extraction/Secret-Value-Extraction query if A is a Type-I/Type-II adversary.
III. CLOUD-BASED CL-PDP IN EMRS SYSTEM
Our CL-PDP protocol consists of four entities which is shown in FIGURE 2, including Patient (data owner), Verifier (doctor, medical researcher and other data user), Cloud Medical Server CMS, and the key generation center KGC. Firstly, Patient registers in the system by using a pseudonyms pID = H (ID), and authorizes a class of special verifier to access a symmetric key k, such as doctor, medical researcher who needs the detailed physical data. This key is used to protect the blocks of EMRs under the fully homomorphic encryption algorithm Enc. Secondly, Patient interacts with KGC to obtain the system parameters and a pair of public and private keys. Thirdly, Patient uploads his/her protected EMRs to CMS. Finally, Verifier checks the integrity of these encrypted EMRs. Moreover, for the special verifiers, they enable to decrypt the ciphertext of EMRs to be the corresponding plaintext. The detailed descriptions are listed as follows:
(1)Patient: It is a user of the system who has ability to upload her EMRs to the remote CMS. Patient could generate the private key and the corresponding public key by herself.
(2)Verifier: It is the third party, who sends the remote data integrity challenge to CMS. After accessing the proof from CMS, it honestly verifies the proof and extracts the plaintext of EMRs for the special verifiers. If the proof passes the verification, the remote EMRs are regarded as the complete file. Otherwise, it considers that these EMRs are distorted by the unauthorized adversary.
(3)CMS: It is managed by the CSP in public, whose responsibility is providing storage space and computation resource. CMS is a semitrusted third party, who has ability to delete or modified the stored data undetected.
(4) KGC: It is a semitrusted third party as well, who is responsible for making some maintenances on the whole system, include generating the system parameters, outputting the public and private key pair according to the identity of the user, and so on. However, it has ability to tamper the user's public key curiously.
IV. THE PROPOSED CL-PDP SCHEME
To promote the trust level of KGC and the efficiency, we propose a novel CL-PDP scheme without the bilinear pairing operation. This protocol comprises eight algorithms and the notations are listed in TABLE 1, which are described detailedly as follows.
(1) Setup: Given a security parameter 1 σ , KGC chooses an additive group G with an arbitrary generator P ∈ G, whose order is a prime p. KGC also picks x ∈ Z * p randomly and computes X = x · P. Then, it selects five collision resistant hash functions H t : {0, 1} * → Z * p , where t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}. At last, the system parameters are params = {p, G, P, X , {H t } 5 t=1 }, and the master private key is mpk = x.
(2) User-Registration: Supposing that ID is a true identity of Patient. To provide a unconditional anonymity, Patient takes use of a pseudonyms pID = H 1 (ID) to register in this system. Moreover, she picks y ∈ Z * p uniformly at random, computes Y = y · P, and returns (pk, sk) = (Y , y), where pk is public to KGC, and sk is kept privately by herself.
(3) Extract-Partial-Key: KGC picks α ∈ Z * p at random, 
To produce a proof of EMRs, it runs the following algorithms. a) Verifier randomly chooses a subset I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and a number w i ∈ Z * p for each i ∈ I . After that, he sends {i, w i } i∈I to CMS as a challenge message. b) CMS randomly picks an element β C ∈ Z * p and computes
A F B C T C ). At last, CMS outputs the proof 
If it is not valid, Verifier confirms that the stored EMRs is distorted and outputs ''Reject''. Otherwise, Verifier outputs ''Accept''. Furthermore, for the authorized verifiers with secret key k, they have the capability of decrypting every Enc k (m i ) to access the plain EMRs as
Correctness:
Provided that every entity is honest in the process of executing the above specified algorithms, the correctness of this protocol comes from the following derivation.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed CL-PDP protocol which satisfies the following security requirements.
1) UNCONDITIONALLY ANONYMOUS
According to the algorithm in Patient-Registration, Patient takes use of the pseudonyms pID to register in the system instead of the true identity ID. Moreover, in the following executions, every entity calculates the related parameters by pseudonyms as well. No one enables to access the true identity of Patient, even if it is the KGC. Thus, our protocol provides the unconditionally anonymous of Patient.
2) PRESERVING PRIVACY
According to the algorithm Tag-Generation, because of the sensitiveness of EMRs, they are stored in the CMS in the form of ciphertext. Anyone cannot derive the correct EMRs without the valid secret key k. In the process of verification, the Verifier just checks the integrity of cipher-
. Only if the Verifier is authorized by Patient, could it achieve the valid key k, and then decrypt
under the property of the fully homomorphic encryption. At last, these authorized verifiers recover the whole plain EMRs to do some diagnosis, experiment tests and medical researches. Thus, our protocol enables to preserve the privacy of Patient.
3) PUBLIC VERIFIABILITY
According to the algorithms Generate-Proof and VerifyProof for checking the integrity in the proposal, it is obviously that the patient is not involved in the verification process. Moreover, it is unnecessary to download the EMRs for Verifier. Thus, our proposal enjoys the public verifiability.
4) RELIABILITY
In this protocol, Patient-Registration algorithm must be operated prior to the Extract-Partial-Key algorithm. According to this method, Patient picks her secret key sk and public key pk firstly. Then, KGC employs pk and pseudonyms pID to generate the Patient's partial key D pID . Although the semitrusted KGC can replace pk by itself, there will exist two valid public keys pk and pk for only one pID. Moreover, two valid different public keys PK pID and PK pID with only one Patient's pID can be generated by the two partial private keys, and only the KGC has this ability to output these two valid partial private keys. Therefore, the KGC's forgery is easy to be tracked, which promotes the trust level of KGC to Level-III in this protocol. Thus, our proposal can guarantee the reliability of the semitrusted third party KGC.
B. SECURITY PROOF
In this subsection, we prove that the proposed CL-PDP scheme is secure against two types of adversary in the random oracle model.
Theorem 1:
Given H t (t = 1, 2, . . . , 5) are five collision resistant hash functions, this scheme is secure in the random model assuming that there is no probability polynomial time algorithm that can solve the DL and CDH problems with nonnegligible probability.
This theorem following from two lemmas will show that this CL-PDP scheme is secure against the Type-I and Type-II adversaries whose behaviors are described above.
Lemma 1: This CL-PDP scheme is secure against Type-I adversary if the DL and CDH problems are intractable.
Proof: Supposing that a Type-I adversary A I wins the game defined in Definition 3 with a non-negligible probability . Also, there is a challenger C that can solve DL and CDH problems with a non-negligible probability by interacting with A I . To solve these two problems, C needs to perform each algorithm of game for A I as follows:
Setup: Given an instance (P, Q = x · P) of the DL problem, and an instance (P, A = a · P, B = b · P) of the CDH problem, where x, a, b ∈ Z * p are unknown to A I . Then, C gives A I the system parameters params = {p, G, P, Q, {H t } 5 t=1 }. At last, C selects ID * as a challenge identity. 
Partial-Key-Extraction: C responses A I as follows: (1) If pID i = H 1 (ID * ), C aborts the game. (2) Otherwise, C performs the following:
chosen by the adversary A I , C records all the changes.
Secret-Value-Extraction:
On receiving a query on ID i , C computes pID i = H 1 (ID i ) and searches the list L K for the tuple (pID i , y i , z i , Y i , γ i , Q i ). Then, it returns y i to A I as an answer.
Generate-Tag: For the EMRs file F with name name F , C produces the tag of m j as follows:
(1) If pID i = H 1 (ID * ), C aborts the game. (2) Otherwise, C selects an element a F ∈ Z * p at random, and computes
The challenger C returns (T j , s F , A F , T F ) to the adversary A I as an answer.
Guess 1: Supposing that the adversary A I enables to forge the one-time-use keys (s F , A F ) depending on the Patient's identity ID i . If ID i is not equal to ID * , C aborts the game. Due to the validity of (s F , A F ), we have the following equation.
Hence,
Based on the forking lemma [36] , choosing six different hash functions in two groups (H 1 2 , H 2 2 , H 3 2 ) and (H 1 3 , H 2 3 , H 3 3 ), we can derive the following set of linear equations:
There are three unknown elements in the set of linear equations (1) . The challenger C has ability to figure out this equations set and accessing the value x. Therefore, C can solve the DL problem successfully.
Analysis 1: We denote the event that A I forges a pair of one-time-use verification keys (s F , A F ) as E 1 , the event that C does not abort the game on querying to Partial-KeyExtraction and Generate-Tag as E 2 , and the event that ID i is equal to ID * as E 3 . Let q H 2 , q Par and q Gen be the number of querying on H 2 , Partial-Key-Extraction and Generate-Tag algorithms in the game respectively. We can conclude that Pr(E 1 ) = , Pr(E 2 |E 1 )
The probability that C solves the DL problem is
For the reason that there is no probability polynomial time algorithm that can solve the DL problem with non-negligible probability, i.e., is a negligible value. Hence, there is no Type-I adversary A I that can forge these one-time-use verification keys.
Guess 2: Supposing that A I can forge a proof (A F , T F , B C , T C , s C , s F ) according to the Patient's identity ID i . If ID i is not equal to ID * , C aborts the game. Due to the validity of the proof, C chooses two elements ξ, η ∈ Z * p , computes T F = ξ · B, s 1 C · P = η · A, it enables to solve the CDH problem as follows:
Analysis 2: By using a similar analysis, we can conclude that there is no probability polynomial time algorithm solving the CDH problem with non-negligible probability. Therefore, this CL-PDP scheme is secure against Type-I adversary assuming that the DL and CDH problems are intractable.
Lemma 2: This CL-PDP scheme is secure against Type-II adversary if the DL and CDH problems are intractable.
Proof: Supposing that a Type-II adversary A II can win the game with a non-negligible probability . There is a challenger C that can solve the DL and CDH problems with a non-negligible probability by interacting with A II . To solve these problems, C needs to perform each algorithm of game for A II as follows:
Setup: Given an instance (P, Q = δ · P) of the DL problem, and an instance (P, A = a · P, B = b · P) of the CDH problem, where δ, a, b ∈ Z * p randomly. Then, C selects a random element x ∈ Z * p to compute X = x · P, and gives A II the system parameters params = (p, G, P, X , {H t } 5 t=1 ) and x. At last, C selects ID * as a challenge identity. H t -Queries: Similar to H t -Queries in the Proof of Lemma 1.
Create-Data-Owner: On receiving an identity ID i , C computes pID i = H 1 (ID i ) firstly, and keeps a list of (pID i , y i , z i , Y i , γ i , Q i ) in L K , which is initialized empty. Upon receipt of this query, C verifies whether
Partial 
Generate-Tag: For the EMRs file F with name name F , C generates every tag of m j as follows:
(1) If pID i = H 1 (ID * ), C sets A F = X and aborts the game. (2) Otherwise, C selects an element a F ∈ Z * p randomly, and computes 
Hence, from the set of linear equations (2), we can conclude that 
The probability that C solves the DL problem is Since there is no probability polynomial time algorithm that can solve the DL problem successfully with nonnegligible probability, i.e., is a negligible value. Hence, there is no Type-II adversary A II that can forge these onetime-use verification keys.
According to the same analysis in the Proof of Lemma 1, we derive that A II cannot forge a proof either. Therefore, this CL-PDP scheme is secure against Type-II adversary assuming the DL and CDH problems are intractable.
In summary, based on the proof of these two lemmas, we complete the formal proof of Theorem 1.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the performance of our CL-PDP scheme with other related protocols on communication cost, computation cost and some features. As the required shortest key length determined in National Bureau of Standards and ANSI X9: RSA, DSA and ECC are 1024bits, 1024bits and 160bits respectively [37] . Taking use of the type A bilinear pairing on the supersingular elliptic curve, we know that the base field F p has 512 bits and the order has 160bits.
A. COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS
Assuming that the blocks that make up a EMR can be represented by an integer with 64 bits. The communication overhead of the proposal is given based on the interaction among data owner, cloud server and the third party verifier (i.e., Patient, CMS and Verifier in this scheme). In the phase of Tag-Generation, the communication overhead between Patient and CMS consists of tuples ofT
Thus, the communication overhead of this phase is (160 + 160)n + 160 + 160 + 160 = (320n + 480)bits. In the phase of Generate-Proof, the communication overhead between CMS and Verifier consists of tuples of the operation of bilinear pairing, exponentiation and multiplication on the group. The other operations, such as modular inversion and addition of two elliptic curve points, contribute less computation cost. According to reference [38] , TABLE 3 is defined, which shows the computational cost required to perform each cryptographic operation, where T m denotes the computation cost required to perform a modular multiplication operation. Without considering the cost of general hash function and homomorphism encryption, multiplication in the phase of Tag-Generation, Patient needs one scalar point multiplication for each block m i . To generate the proof of the stored EMRs, it needs (n + 3) scalar point multiplications and (n − 1) additions of two elliptic curve points at most. As for verification, Verifier executes the Verify-Proof algorithm, which computes seven scalar point multiplications and three additions of two elliptic curve points altogether to check the correctness of the stored EMRs. Therefore, in totally, our CL-PDP scheme requires (2n + 10)T s and (n + 2)T a in these three phases of tag and proof generation and proof verification. The detailed computation costs between ours and other related schemes are demonstrated in TABLE 4 and FIGURE 5, where the required cost notations are defined in TABLE 3 . At last, we also make some comparisons on the important security properties. TABLE 5 shows that this proposal achieves unconditionally anonymous and privacy preservation, while it gets rids of certification management and key escrow problems. Furthermore, the credit level of KGC reaches the highest.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
EMRs are entirely stored in the remote cloud-based medical server, which is out of control from patient. To check the integrity of EMRs in CMS, in this paper, we have proposed an efficient CL-PDP scheme without bilinear pairing. Through the security analysis, it shows that our scheme is secure in the random oracle model under the hardness assumption of the DL and CDH problems. Moreover, this scheme promotes the trust level of KGC to the highest, provides the privacy preservation and enjoys the unconditionally anonymous of patient. A thorough performance evaluation indicates that our protocol is advantages over the other related schemes in communication and computation overhead. Due to the robustness and efficiency, this CL-PDP scheme is more suitable for EMRs system in the cloud-based medical server. SHAOCONG FENG is currently pursuing the bachelor's degree with the Department of Information and Communication Engineering, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications. His current research interests are in the area of information science, data security, and blockchain technology. VOLUME 7, 2019 
